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by Byron Warnken 
The general rule is that prior inconsis-
tent statements of a witness are inadmis-
sible as substantive evidence because of 
the hearsay rule, and the prior inconsis-
tent statement can only be used for the 
purpose of impeaching the credibility of 
the witness. The prior inconsistent 
statement, under this traditional view, is 
hearsay because it was not taken under 
oath, is not subject to cross-examination, 
and was not taken in the presence of the 
trier of fact. The contra, more modem, 
minority view is that an oath does not 
guarantee trustworthiness of testimony, 
that the declarant can be cross-
examined, and that the trier of fact can 
observe and judge the demeanor of the 
witness on the stand. (McCormick on 
Evidence § 251) 
Maryland follows the traditional view 
that prior inconsistent statements are not 
probative evidence on the merits and are 
not to be treated as having any substan-
tive or independent testimonial value. 
(Wilson v. State, 20 Md. App. 318, 326 
(1974); Kraft v. Freedman, 15 Md. App. 
187, 195-96 (1972); Sun Cab Co. v. 
Walston, 15 Md. App. 113, 135 (1972); 
Westv. Belle Isle Cab Co., 203 Md. 244, 
253 (1953). Although not admissible as 
substantive evidence, the prior inconsis-
tent statement made by a witness is ad-
missible for the purpose of impeaching 
the credibility of the witness. (Sun Cab 
Co., Inc. v. Cusick, 209 Md. 354, 
361-62 (1956); Parks v. State, 113 Md. 
338, 340 (1910). This includes the wit-
ness' testimony from a previous trial. 
(Foble v. Knefely, 176 Md. 474, 485 
(1939). 
To pursue the impeachment process, 
the inconsistency between the prior 
statement and the testimony at the trial 
must pertain to a material issue. (Sun 
Cab Co. v. Walston, 15 Md. App. 113, 
132; Joppy v. Hopkins, 231 Md. 52, 56 
(1962). In addition, before the prior in-
consistent statement can be admitted for 
impeachment purposes, a proper foun-
dation must be laid, by asking the wit-
ness on cross-examination whether he 
or she had made such contradictory 
statement to a designated person and 
apprising the witness of the time and 
place when the statement was supposed 
to have been made. (Cooper v. State, 14 
Md. App. 106, 111 (1972); Estep v. 
State, 14Md. App. 53, 70 (1972); San-
ders v. State, 1 Md. App. 630, 640-42 
(1967); Campbell v. patton, 227 Md. 
125, 141 (1961). Where the priorincon-
sistent statement was verbal, the witness' 
attention must be called to the state-
ment, with a specification of the time and 
place, so that the witness may be given 
an opportunity to explain the cir-
cumstances surrounding the making of 
the statement, and so that it may be de-
termined whether there is actually an in-
consistency. (Baltimore Transit Co. v. 
State ex. rei. Castranda, 194 Md. 421, 
433 (1950). If the witness states that he 
does not recall making the alleged prior 
inconsistent statement, it is competent to 
prove that the statement was made and 
to let the jury consider such proof in es-
timating the credit to be given to the tes-
timony of the witness. (Leister v. State, 
136 Md. 518, 523 (1920). Thus, im-
peaching evidence may be offered if the 
witness denies having made the previ-
ous statement, or if he states that he does 
not remember whether he made it. 
If the witness making the contradic-
tory statement is one's own witness, an 
additional criterion exists because of the 
general rule that a party may not im-
peach his own witness. In this case, the 
party calling the witness must first satisfy 
the Court that he has been taken by sur-
prise, and that the testimony is contrary 
to what he had a right to expect. If the 
Court is so satisfied, it may allow the 
party to question the witness in a leading 
manner; this is to elicit proof of the prior 
inconsistent statement to show that the 
party calling the witness has been sur-
prised by the witness' testimony, why 
the witness was called, and that the wit-
ness was called in good faith. These prior 
inconsistent statements are, of course, 
not probative evidence. (Green v. State, 
243 Md. 154, 157-58 (1966). 
A witness whose testimony has be-
come suspect by a showing of prior in-
consistent statements may rehabilitate 
himself by offering evidence of other 
statements made by him which are in ac-
cord with his testimony or by explaining 
the reasons for any such inconsistencies. 
(Virginia Freight Lines, Inc. v. 
Montgomery, 256Md. 221, 226 (1969). 
The witness may thus render his prior 
statements consistent, or there may exist 
a situation of prior statements having 
been consistent all along. In either case, 
the prior consistent statements, like the 
prior inconsistent statements, have no 
substantive value, but only credibility 
value. In the case of the prior consistent 
statement, there is no need to look to the 
prior statement for substantive value in 
any event, since its consistent 
counterpart - the testimony at the 
trial - is substantive evidence. 
The witness' prior statement may con-
tain "A". In court he may say "8" when 
questioned by the party calling him. The 
party calling him will claim surprise, and 
upon laying the proper foundation, will 
be permitted to bring in the prior state-
ment "A", not as substantive evidence, 
but to show why the witness was called. 
Once the surprise phase has been con-
cluded, firect examination will resume, 
whereupon the witness may say "A". 
Now "A" is substantive evidence, not 
through its prior statement form, but 
through its probative value as direct tes-
timony. (Tates v. State, Md. App. No. 
624 (unreported) (1974). 
These rules as to prior statements 
apply only to a witness. There is a wide 
difference between the declaration of an 
ordinary witness, a stranger to the case, 
and the declaration of a party to the re-
cord. The latter, being the admissions of 
a party to the record against his interest, 
are substantive evidence and may be 
offered to prove the truth of the matters 
thus admitted. (Smith v. Branscome, 
251 Md. 582,589 (1968); Wolfe v. State 
ex. rei. Brown, 173 Md. 103, 110 
(1937); Bartlett v. Wilbur, 53 Md. 485, 
497-98 (1880);M.L.E.Evidence § 141). 
A related area is the difference be-
tween a memorandum of past recollec-
tion recorded and a memorandum used 
to revive present recollection. A past re-
collection recorded is used in a situation 
where a witness, who is either devoid of 
a present recollection or possessed of an 
imperfect present recollection, desires to 
use a past recollection. The witness must 
identify the memorandum as made im-
mediately after, or contemporaneously 
with, the event, and that the memoran-
dum is a correct statement of those facts 
which the witness recorded. It must be 
adduced from the witness that he or she 
at one time had personal knowledge of 
the facts, that the writing was, when 
made, an accurate record of the event, 
and that after seeing the writing, he has 
not sufficient present independent recol-
lection of the facts to testify accurately in 
regard thereto. Present recollection re-
vived involves the use, by a witness, of a 
writing or other object to refresh his re-
collection so that he may testify about 
events from present recollection. The 
memorandum in the former instance has 
substantive value; in the latter it does 
not. (Askins v. State, 13 Md. App. 702, 
709-10 (1971). 
Although Maryland recognizes and 
continues to reaffirm the principle that a 
substantive fact cannot be established by 
impeachment of a witness, not a party to 
the suit, by previous contradictory 
statements, both the Court of Special 
Appeals and the Court of Appeals have 
acknowledged the existence of a contra 
minority view. (Wilson v. State, 20 Md. 
App. 318, 326-27 (1974); Kraft v. 
Freedman, 15 Md. 187, 195-96 (1972); 
Clay v. State, 211 Md. 577, 583 (1956); 
Westv. Belle Isle Cab Co., 203 Md. 244, 
253). This view permits the substantive 
use of prior inconsistent statements on 
the theory that the usual dangers of 
hearsay are largely nonexistent where 
the witness testifies at trial. Having been 
urged by most legal commentators, this 
view finds expression in current propos-
als to codify the law of evidence and has 
been adopted in some jurisdictions. 
The America Law Institute Model 
Code of Evidence Rule 503 (a) proVides 
that evidence of a hearsay declaration is 
admissible if the judge finds that the dec-
larant is present and subject to cross-
examination. 
The Uniform Rules of Evidence Rule 
63 (1) provides that a statement previ-
ously made by a person who is present at 
the hearing and available for cross-
examination, is substantively admissible 
provided the statement would be admis-
sible if made by declarant while testifying 
as a witness. The comment to the rule 
contends that when sentiment is laid 
aside there is little basis for objection to 
this enlightened modification of the rule 
against hearsay. 
Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 801 
(d) (1) provides that prior statements by 
a witness are not hearsay if the declarant 
testifies at the trial or hearing and is sub-
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Some form of the above three rules is 
now used not only in the federal court 
system, but also in several state jurisdic-
tions (e.g., California, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, New Jersey, Utah). In addition, 
Wisconsin, without the aid of a statute or 
general rule of court, has held that prior 
inconsistent written statements, made by 
a witness who is in court and subject to 
cross-examination, are admissible not 
only for impeachment, but also for sub-
stantive evidence. (Gelhaar v. State, 41 
Wis.2d 230 (1970). 
Concerning the constitutionality of 
admitting prior inconsistent statements 
as substantive evidence, the Supreme 
: " 
Court said that the confrontation clause 
of the Sixth Amendment, as made 
applicable to the states by the Four-
teenth Amendment, is not violated by 
admitting a declarant's out-of-court 
statements, as long as he is testifying as a 
witness at trial and is subject to full 
cross-examination. The court said that 
the purposes of the Amendment are 
satisfied at the time of trial, even if not be-
fore, since the witness is under oath, is 
subject to cross-examination, and his 
demeanor can be observed by the trier 
of fact. (Califomia v. Green, 399 U.S. 
149, 153-64 (1970). 
In Maryland, in addition to the Court 
of Appeals' 1974 reaffirmation of its 
adherence to the traditional view pro-
hibiting prior inconsistent statements as 
substantive evidence (Wilson v. State, 
20 Md. App. 318, 326-27 (1974), it is 
noted that the 1975 regular session of 
the General Assembly received no bills 
proposing statutory eVidentiary rules. 
Thus, there is nothing at the present time 
to indicate to the bar or the bench that 
Maryland will adopt the modern minor-
ity, yet apparently ever-growing, view 
that prior inconsistent statements can be 
used as substantive evidence. 
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